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Summary  findings
Since 1989, private capital flows to a select group of  and Rudolph explain why private capital flows to some
developing countries have increased sharply, but  developing countries but not to others (using panel data
developments in 1994 have caused concern about the  for 1986-93  for 22 countries).
sustainability of those flows. Several highly indebted  They argue that a generalized reversal is unlikely in
developing countries that are implementing reform are  countries that maintain a fundamentally sound
concerned that a generalized reversal - similar to  macroeconomic environment. In fact, their empirical
episodes of capital flight in the early 1980s - might  results show that domestic factors such as domestic
disrupt their economies and threaten  economic reform.  savings and investment ratios significantly affected the
Because the surge in private capital flows coincided  recent surge in capital inflows.
with a period of low international  interest rates and  Further, they suggest that countries that have not
intensive policy reform in developing countries, debate  received significant foreign capital - including countries
has been active about whether the surge is driven mainly  in Sub-Saharan Africa - could begin to if they
by domestic (pull) or external (push) factors. Under the  implemented structural reforms that allow them to
pull hypothesis, successful domestic policies are the key  export,  save, and invest at higher rates. Reducing their
to ensuring sustainable capital inflows; under the push  foreign debt (which might call for a continuation  of
hypothesis, an increase in international interest rates  recent debt reduction operations) could also help attract
would cause a reversal of those flows (back to the  foreign private investors.
industrial world).
Using a partial adjustment model in which both
domestic and external variables are defined, Hernandez
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Since 1989, there has been a sharp increase in private capital flows to developing countries. The
similarity  between conditions in the early  1980s and those  in 1994-an  increase in interest rates  in the
industrial countries after several years in which developing countries received sizable capital inflows,  and
the  recent  Mexican  crisis -has  reopened  the  question  of  the  sustainability  of  these  flows  and  the
appropriate policy responses to an adverse external shock to avoid a reversal of flows. In other words, the
recent Mexican experience highlights the risks of a generalized reversal of flows and reopens the question
of  sustainability at a time when several developing  countries remain highly indebted and  are still in the
process  of completing some necessary economic reforms. Within this  context, a generalized  reversal of
flows could seriously disrupt the economies of these countries and threaten their economic reform process.
The sustainability problem concerns the forces that have driven these flows in recent years, their
relative  importance,  and  the  possibility that  they  could  move  adversely  in  the  future.  This  research
addresses these issues, particularly that of identifying the driving forces behind the surge in private flows.
Because the surge in private capital inflows since  1989 has coincided with a period of low international
interest rates and domestic policy reform in the developing world, there is a debate about whether the surge
is driven primarily  by  domestic (pull)  or  external (push) factors. Under the  pull hypothesis  successful
domestic policies are the key to ensuring sustainable capital inflows in the future, while under the push
hypothesis an  increase in international interest rates would cause a reversal of these flows (back  to the
industrialized world).
This research attempts to advance our understanding of the causal factors behind the recent surge
in private capital inflows by including both pull and push factors in a model of the determinants of private
capital  inflows.  In particular,  it uses  a partial adjustment  model  in which  both domestic  and  external
explanatory variables are defined, to explain the private capital flows to developing countries.  The model
is estimated  using  panel  data for  1986-93 for  22 developing  countries,  including  countries that  have
benefited from the new wave of private capital flows and countries that have not received capital flows. In
addition, we compare the means of several economic indicators for two groups of countries: those that have
received significant capital inflows in recent years and those that have not.
Since the start of 1994, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board has raised short-term interest rates six times,  from 3 percent to 6 percent.
Recall that the debt crisis was triggered when Mexico declared a moratorium in its extemal debt in 1982.
iOur  results  show evidence  that  domestic factors  play  a  significant  role  in explaining  private
capital flows.  Thus countries may expect to continue to receive capital flows as long as domestic policy
reforms remain on the right track: that is, as long as they increase domestic savings, use the capital flows to
improve their long-term prospects by increasing investment rates, and increase the growth rate of exports.
In other words, economic fundamentals must be improved to attract foreign investors.
In addition, the paper also discusses developing countries'  risk of facing a major crisis -like  the
debt crisis of  1982-83-in  the  1990s because of external factors, particularly an increase in international
interest rates. We conclude that such a crisis is not likely to occur in the short or medium term, suggesting
that  a  generalized  reversal  of  flows  is not  a  major  threat.  Nevertheless,  in  some  recipient  countries
problems could develop in the short or medium term because of domestic factors. In response, appropriate
corrective policy actions must be taken to strengthen economic fundamentals.
The findings from this research also imply that countries that have not received large amounts of
foreign capital may begin  to receive private inflows if they implement structural reforms that will allow
them  to  export,  save,  and  invest at  higher rates.  Reducing their  foreign debt  (which may  call  for a
continuation of the debt reduction operations of recent years) may also play a significant role in attracting
foreign private investors. This paper also opens up a new direction for further research in regions like Sub-
Sahara Africa, which has not benefited so far from the recent surge in private flows.
..Sustainability of Private  Capital  Flows to Developing Countries:
Is a Generalized  Reversal  Likely?
In recent years there has been a sharp increase in private capital flows to developing countries.  In
fact, the capital account surplus-including  net errors and omissions-for  developing countries as a whole
increased from US$25 billion in 1988 to US$163 billion in 1993, implying an annual growth rate of 46
percent.  During  the same time period, the current  account deficit for developing  countries as  a  group
increased from about US$20 billion to US$98 billion, implying a growth rate of 37 percent a year (IMF
1994).
Yet the sharpest increase has occurred in private rather than in official capital inflows (table  1).
Thus total long-term private flows-which  include foreign direct investment, loans and bond  issues, and
equity portfolio  investment-increased  from US$36 billion in  1988 to about  US$159 billion  in 1993, a
growth  rate of  34 percent  a year  (World Bank  1994).  At the  same time, real  official flows  increased
slightly-from  US$45 billion in 1988 to US$54 billion in 1993 (about 4 percent a year).
The similarity between conditions in the early 1980s and those in 1994-an  increase in interest
rates in industrial countries after several years in which developing countries have received sizable capital
inflows,'  and the recent Mexican criSiS2  -has  reopened the question of the sustainability of these inflows
and the appropriate policy responses to an adverse external shock to avoid a reversal of flows.  In other
words, the recent Mexican experience highlights the risks of a generalized reversal of flows and opens the
question of sustainability in a magnified way.
The issue of sustainability  is particularly relevant because several developing  countries remain
highly indebted  and  are  still  completing the  economic  reforms  necessitated  by  the  debt  crisis,  which
erupted more than a decade ago.  Within this context a generalized reversal of flows, by requiring a sharp
I  Since the start of 1994 the U.S. Federal Reserve Board has raised short-term interest rates six times, from 3 percent to 6 percent.
2  Recall that the debt crisis was triggered when Mexico declared a moratorium in its external debt in 1982.
lreduction  in the current account deficit, could seriously  disrupt the economies  of recipient  countries and
could put at risk the continuation  of economic  reform.
The sustainability  problem concerns forces that have driven these flows in recent years, their
relative  importance,  and the possibility  that  they could move adversely  in the future. This paper addresses
these  issues and,  particularly,  that of identifying  the driving  forces  behind  the surge  in private  flows.
Because the surge in private capital inflows has coincided  with a period of low international
interest  rates and a period  of domestic  policy  reform  in the developing  world,  there has been a debate in the
literature  about whether  the surge  is driven  primarily  by domestic  or by extemal  factors. Calvo and others
(1993) and Fernandez-Arias  (1994) see the new wave of private capital inflows as being "pushed" by
external factors-low  rates of interest in the industrial countries and a slowdown in their economic
growth-and  therefore  beyond the control of policymakers  in developing  countries. According to these
analysts,  an increase  in international  interest  rates would  cause flows to turn back to the industrial  world.
In contrast,  Chuhan and others  (1993) think  that the surge in inflows  has been driven  mostly by domestic
or "pull" factors,  and view it as evidence  that debt strategies  have worked  and domestic  economic  policies
have been on the right track.  According  to this interpretation,  successful  domestic  policies  are the key to
ensuring sustainable  capital inflows in the future.  But, these studies fall short of identifying  relevant
domestic  variables and therefore  do not provide straightforward  economic  policy recommendations. In
sum, the push-pull  story is still inconclusive.
This  paper attempts  to advance  our understanding  of the causal  factors  behind  the recent surge in
private  capital inflows. It includes  both pull and push factors  in a model  that analyzes  the determinants  of
private  capital inflows,  and establishes  some guidelines  for appropriate  government  policies. The results
show that domestic  factors  and, therefore,  domestic  economic  policies,  matter in explaining  the new wave
of capital inflows,  implying  that developing  countries  may continue  receiving  capital inflows as long as
they use these  resources  to improve  their long-term  prospects.
2The second  section of the paper briefly describes  the recent surge of private  capital inflows and
reviews the literature. This analysis  establishes  the appropriate  framework  for studying  the sustainability
problem, and to analyze the prospects  of developing  countries in the short or medium term. Our main
conclusion  holds that it is very unlikely  that developing  countries  will suffer a significant  adverse  shock in
the short term (including  a reversal  and "hard-landing")  solely  because  of external factors  (as was the case
in the early 1980s).  Nevertheless,  as the recent Mexican  experience  illustrates,  some problems could
develop in the short or medium term because of domestic  factors.  In response appropriate corrective
policy  actions  must be taken  in the short term before  capital  inflows  are reduced.
The third section  sets up a partial  adjustment  model  to explain  private  capital flows to developing
countries. Both domestic  and external  explanatory  variables  are defined. The model  is estimated  for 1986-
93 for 22 developing  countries, including  countries that have benefited  from the new wave of private
capital  flows and countries  that have  not received  capital  flows. The model is estimated  using  a  panel  data
technique  because  it is the most efficient  way of simultaneously  examining  cross-country  relationships  at
any point in time  and country-specific  trends  over  time.
Capital inflows in the 1990s: stylized facts and causes
There  are three outstanding  features  of the current  surge  of capital  inflows. First, although  private
capital flows to developing countries began to increase in  1986 after several years of decline, they
accelerated  when international  interest  rates began to fall (figure 1). In fact, several authors have argued
that the increase in private capital inflows since 1989,  particularly  portfolio  investment  flows, is largely
due to a fall in interest  rates in international  financial  markets  (see Calvo and others 1993 and Fernandez-
Arias 1994).  The fall in interest  rates induced  investors  in industrial  countries  to look elsewhere  for higher
returns, and it improved  the creditworthiness  of all developing  countries-especially the highly indebted
ones-by  reducing  the cost  of servicing  their debt.
3Second, not all developing  countries have benefited equally  from  this surge.  The bulk  of the
capital inflows-70  percent-has  gone to East Asia and Latin America (table 2).  Moreover, within these
regions the distribution among countries has been uneven. In fact, the  15 countries receiving the largest
flows received about 82 percent  of all inflows during  1989-93 (figure 2), this suggesting that  domestic
factors may be important in explaining the new wave of private capital inflows.  The regions and countries
that have benefited the most are, generally, those that have implemented structural reforms in recent years.
This connection provides some support for the pull theory (Chuhan and others  1993).
Three episodes during  1994 in some of the countries that had received significant inflows in the
past further illustrate the importance of domestic factors. In early 1994 the Turkish government was unable
to place a  US$1 billion  bond issue because of the  worsening of  its fiscal deficit during  1993. Mexico
experienced a capital outflow-of  about US$6.3 billion-following  the peasant uprising in Chiapas and the
assassination of  the  ruling party's presidential candidate  (the Mexican crisis of  December  1994 further
confirms  the  important  of  domestic  factors).  In  Venezuela, poor  supervision  and  monitoring  of  the
banking system led to a banking crisis and induced a capital outflow of about US$3 billion.
Third,  the composition of  flows in the  1990s is different from that in the  late  1970s and  early
1  980s, when syndicated bank lending was the major channel through which developing countries borrowed
from abroad.  Today, foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment play a major role, adding
up to about 68 percent of total private flows (table 2).3 The large share of equity investment in the current
surge  is evidence of a  larger risk-sharing component than  in the  late  1970s, possibly  implying that the
flows are more long term than in the past.  The new composition of flows indicates that a structural change
has occurred in international capital markets since the debt crisis, made up of  two elements:
3  The share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 1970's was about 10 percent of total flows, while debt accounted for about
90 percent (both short-and long-term debt)
4*  A technological  change in financial  markets  and in the processing  of information,  which has allowed
institutional  investors  in developed  countries to spread their country risks through greater portfolio
diversification.
*  Greater  access  of developing-country  borrowers  to industrial-country  financial  markets  after the easing
of regulations  in some major industrial  capital markets.  Regulation  changes include the U.S. Security
and Exchange Commission  (SEC)'s  Rule 144a and the new credit guidelines for the Samurai bond
market  introduced  in August 1992.4
External  factors:  a review of the literature
Several authors have attempted  to quantify the importance  of external and domestic  factors in
attracting  capital inflows  to developing  countries. The pioneer  work in this area, Calvo and others (1993),
uses monthly  data on the change in international  reserves (a proxy for monthly  capital inflows) as the
dependent variable,-during  1988-91  for ten Latin American countries. The authors conclude  that the
drop in interest rates and the recession  in industrial  countries  during those years accounted  for about 50
percent of the variability  in these flows, but the authors  do not include  any domestic  variables  to explain
the inflows. Similarly,  Fernandez-Arias  (1994) uses quarterly  data on portfolio  capital flows (bonds plus
equity)  for thirteen  countries  during 1989-93  and concludes  that about 86 percent of the increase  in flows
to these countries since 1989  is due to a fall in interest rates in international  markets.  Nevertheless,  like
Calvo and others  (1993), Femandez-Arias  falls short of including  and trying to identify  relevant  domestic
variables  and,  therefore,  does not provide  straightforward  economic  policy  recommendations. 5
Recently,  there have been  clear signs  that international  interest  rates will recover from the record
low observed  during 1992-93-a clear threat to developing  countries. 6 Yet the increase  in both real and
4  The introduction  of Rule 144A in the U.S. stock exchanges has considerably  simplified trading in foreign equities by
eliminating costly settlements delays, registration  difficulties,  and dividend payment problems.  Under Rule 144A, qualified
institutional  buyers in the United States no longer need to hold securities  for a two-year  period before  they can be sold. Foreign
issuers can now gain access  to a relatively  large number of U.S. institutional  investors.  Similarly,  the credit rating standards for
public placements  of bonds in Japan were  relaxed  according  to the  new credit  guidelines  for the Samurai  bond market.
This may also imply  the existence  of an specification  error  and biases  in their results.
6  The six-month  dollar  denominated  LIBO  rate reached  3.9 and 3.4 percent  in 1992  and 1993,  respectively.  IMF  (1994: 127).
5nominal interest rates is expected to be much  lower than that witnessed  in the years leading to the debt
crisis.  Then, the sharp increase in real interest rates in international markets resulted from a combination
of tight monetary policies in some industrial countries to fight domestic inflation, and expansionary fiscal
policies to boost their domestic economies. Between 1977 and 1981 the nominal LIBO rate rose from 6.5
to  16.7 percent  (the average expost real LIBO rate in U.S. dollars, using the U.S. wholesale price  index,
rose from about 1.8 percent in 1978 to about 11.3 percent, 1982).  By contrast, IMF estimates put the six-
months dollar-denominated LIBO rate at 6.0 percent for 1995, and World Bank estimates put the rate at 5.8
7 percent for the next ten years.
Two major reasons stand behind the assertion that the expected increase in international interest
rates will be minor.  First, current inflation rates in industrial countries are much lower than those in the
late 1970s.  In fact, the average inflation rate (using the consumer price index) for all industrial countries
was 2.9  percent in 1993, and  it is forecasted to be  slightly lower in the next several years.  By contrast,
during  1979-81 that rate of inflation ranged from 9 to 12 percent.8 Second, the recent deficits run by the
governments of  the major industrial economies will force them to pursue a prudent fiscal policy  in the
future. In fact, these deficits are expected to be lowered by almost two percentage points of GDP during the
next three years.9
Thus, although the increase in international interest rates represents a serious threat for developing
countries, in real terms the increase will probably  not be as great as the increase in the early  1980s and,
therefore, will not be the major cause of a reversal of flows.
7  IMF (1994:  17); World Bank, (1994, 7).
9  IMF (1994:  17); World Bank (1994: 7); IMF list in references (1986: 188).
9  The General Govemment Fiscal deficit of the major industrial countries increased from 1.7 percent of aggregate output in 1979
to about 4 percent in  1983-84; it then steadily decreased to a record low of 1.3 percent in  1989. It began  increasing thereafter  to
reach  3.8 and 4.3 percent in  1992 and  1993, respectively. It is expected to fall to 3.9 and 3.5 percent of GDP in  1994 and 1995,
respectively, and to be about 2.6 percent for the following three years. IMF (1986:  196, 1994: 57).
6Another external factor standing behind the surge is the structural change in international financial
markets and this is believed to be caused by permanent rather than transitory factors (that is, the change is
due to technological and  institutional developments that  are most likely nonreversible).  Also, the  larger
share of equity investment in the current surge of inflows suggests that foreign investors now have a longer
investment horizon than in the late 1970s. As a result, there is little chance of seeing a reversal of flows in
the short run because of a temporary negative development, which most likely would be the case with hot
money.  In sum, variables external to developing countries are unlikely to change substantially in the short
or medium term, thus a generalized reversal of capital inflows would not be induced.
In addition to the two papers already discussed, Chuhan and  others (1993) tries to measure the
importance of domestic factors, as well as external factors, using monthly data on portfolio flows (bonds
plus equity)  from U.S. sources as the dependent variable.  The sample includes  18 developing (recipient)
countries in East Asia and Latin America during 1988-92. The authors conclude that domestic factors are at
least as important  as external factors  in attracting flows to Latin American  countries,  and three to  four
times  more important  for East Asian  countries.  Yet their  conclusions have  limited  policy  implications
because the  explanatory  variables  used as  proxies  for domestic factors-for  example,  the  stock price-
earnings  ratios  and  the  secondary  market  price  of  a  country's  external  debt-are  not  controlled  by
policymakers.  Furthermore,  as  demonstrated  in  Fernandez-Arias  (1994),  the  domestic  explanatory
variables used by Chuhan and others (1993) are not independent of international interest rates.
Although external factors may explain a large part of the recent surge in capital inflows, the three
papers mentioned  above have limited implications because they fail to include in their  samples countries
that have not received substantial inflows in recent years, possibly inducing a sample-bias problem. Indeed,
as  mentioned  earlier,  the  uneven  distribution  of  private  flows  among  regions  and  among  developing
countries within those regions-as  well as the recent developments in Mexico, Turkey, and Venezuela-is
suggestive of the role played by domestic factors in attracting flows to developing countries. Furthermore,
the recipient countries began receiving the inflows in different periods, with some starting as early as 1988
7or 1989  (Thailand  and Malaysia,  respectively),  and others  as recently  as 1992  or 1993  (The Philippines  and
Peru, respectively).  The importance  of domestic  factors  can be assessed  by comparing  those countries  that
have  received  sizable  capital  inflows  with  those  that have  not attracted  sizable  inflows  in the past.
The role of domestic  factors:  a preliminary  assessment
For the purpose of this analysis developing  countries are separated  into two categories: high-
capital-inflow  recipient countries (HCIR) are those that in recent years have received private inflows
averaging  more than 2 percent  of their 1992  GNP annually.  Low-capital-inflow  recipient  countries  (LCIR)
are those that have received,  on average,  less than 2 percent of their 1992  GNP, annually.  Capital  inflows
are averaged  over a period starting  when  the surge  began in each country  (the cutoff period)  and ending  in
1993,  or between  1990  and 1993  if there is no clear cutoff period  (table  3).
Several striking  differences  between  the two groups can be seen (table 4).  First, savings as a
percentage of GNP for the HCIR countries is about twice as high as that for the LCIR countries.
Furthermore,  the countries  that save the least within  the HCIR group  (Argentina  and Mexico-17 percent)
still save more  than the average  for the LCIR  group. The higher savings  rate in the HCIR group  is mainly
a result of a lower consumption  rate of the private  sector.  The HCIR countries  have consistently  invested
about eight percentage  points more of GNP than the LCIR countries. It follows that national (foreign)
savings have financed  a larger (smaller)  share of domestic  investment  in the HCIR countries  than in the
LCIR countries.
Second, the fiscal deficit in the LCIR countries is five times larger than that of the HCIR
countries, meaning that both the private and the public sectors save more in the HCIR countries.
Consequently,  the average monthly inflation rate is about 1.2 percent higher in the LCIRs than in the
HCIRs;  that is, about 14 percent  higher  per year.
8Third, the  LCIR countries appear to be  more unstable  on several grounds.  The coefficient  of
variability of the monthly  inflation rate for the LCIRs is twice as large as that of the HCIR group.  This
difference is even greater when using the variance of the monthly inflation rate, which  is computed after
excluding  the  outliers in both groups  (Argentina, Brazil, and Zaire).  Likewise,  the real  exchange rate
appears to be more volatile in the LCIR countries, probably adversely affecting their export industry.'0 In
addition, the political risk  index (PRI)  for the LCIR group  is almost  11 points  below that of  the  HCIR
group. "  Moreover, for the LCIR countries this index is well below the prohibitive risk level of 40.
Finally, countries in the HCIR group appear to be more creditworthy in that they maintained lower
indebtedness and  a higher reserves ratio during the early years of the high capital inflows episode and have
better-performing export industries.  In fact, prior to the surge the stock of international reserves  for the
HCIR countries was, on average, twice as high as that for the LCIR countries, while  indebtedness was
about half as great.  In addition, the export ratio in the HCIR countries is four percentage points higher than
that in the LCIR  countries-10  percent  points higher (32.8 percent  compared with 23.2  percent)  if the
outliers in each group are excluded (Argentina among the HCIR group at 10.8 percent, and Jordan among
the LCIR group at 86.8  percent).  Furthermore, exports have also been growing at a higher rate  in real
terms in the HCIRs than in the LCIRs-the  respective compound rates of growth are  8.5 percent  and 4.8
percent annually-meaning  that the repayment capacity of the HCIRs is improving faster than that of the
LCIRs.
These facts provide a motivation for trying to assess more precisely the importance of pull factors.
Although  our  empirical analysis  in the next  section  looks similar to those  carried out  earlier by  other
authors,  some important differences  are worth noticing. First, we use a more comprehensive data set in
that, instead of relying only on portfolio investment flows as the dependent variable, all sources of private
10 It is important  to note that,  because  of missing  data,  the average  group  variance  in the LCIR countries  is computed  with  only six
data  points: Bolivia,  Egypt,  India,  Jordan,  Morocco,  and  Nigeria.
11 The PRI was developed  by Business  Environment  Risk Intelligence  (BERI).  This index  measures  the sociopolitical  conditions
in a country using a 0-100  scale. An increase  in this index  means lower political  risk. A prohibitive  risk (index below  40) means
that political  conditions  severely  restrict  business  operations:  asset losses  are  possible  and disturbances  are part  of daily life.
9long-term  funds are included  (portfolio  flows;  foreign  direct investment,  which accounts  for 50 percent of
the inflows;  and private  loans).  Second,  a larger  sample  of 22 developing  countries-all  of those for which
all relevant data are available-for the period 1986-93,  is evaluated.  As a result, we examine countries in
the LCIR  group  as well as in the HCIR  group.' 2 Third,  as in Dooley and others (1994),  we try to identify
some domestic  variables  that may affect capital inflows  and that, at the same  time, can be more easily (at
least indirectly)  modified  by policymakers  in  developing  countries.' 3 Finally, because  we  use  annual
data, our results  have a longer-term  interpretation  than those of previous  studies.  Our results also allow for
a dynamic  analysis of capital inflows,  showing  that the change in either domestic or external conditions
will cause the inflows  to adjust over  time (as opposed  to the static analysis  adopted  by the papers  discussed
above).
A stock adjustment  model
Suppose that a group of foreign agents is interested in investing in a  particular developing
country.  It is assumed  that there is a desired stock of foreign liabilities  for each developing  country i,
which  depends  on internal  as well as external  conditions.  This stock  can be represented  by:
D  * i,a  =  + Xi  (1)
where  D* is the desired  stock  of foreign  liabilities  and  Xis the vector  of exogenous  variables. In any given
period t, the desired  value of the stock of foreign  liabilities  (D*i,)  may not be completely  realized because
of infonnation,  physical,  or procedural  constraints. The adjustment  process  can be represented  as:
fi,  =_  Di, - Di. -,i = S(D  $ it  - Dai  - ,) +y(f, -,i +  it  (2)
with 0 < 6, y < I . This equation  specifies  that the change  in the stock of foreign liabilities  responds to
the difference  between  the desired stock of D and the lagged value of D, and the flow of the previous
period,  plus a random  error term  C.  The partial adjustment  mechanism  implies that private capital inflows
12  The final sample was dictated  by real  exchange  rate data availability.  The following  countries  were included  in the panel data
regression: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,  Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Mexico,  Venezuela,  Jordan,  Morocco,  Tunisia,  and Nigeria.
13 Dooley and  others  (1994)  uses the secondary  market  price of debt (rather  than capital  inflows)  as the dependent  variable.
10(which includes  foreign direct investment)  adjust the stock of foreign liabilities  only partially toward its
optimal  level,  D*, which in  turn varies along  with changes  in the underlying  variables  Xi.  The rationale  for
this first  term is the standard  one: it reflects  the increasing  costs of adjusting  to the desired  stock of foreign
liabilities,  when referring  to new investment  projects. The second term, y Jl,,, reflects the presence of
contractual obligations  or changes in investment  flows for decisions  made earlier, which are modified
during  the second  period  given the prevailing  state of nature.  14
Substituting  for D% 1, in equation  2 and solving  for the amount  of flows  (K,)  gives:
fit  = 8a±  + 8PX%D  - iD,,  + yfi,  +  Ein  (3)
Equation  3 can be rewritten  as:
f,  i  =a'  +  +3'  Xy -5  1- M+yft  -I  it  (4)
where a'=  oa  and 0'=  o,B.
It is important  to note that the model  as written in equation  4 has been designed  to capture only long-
termn  movements  in the stock of foreign  liabilities;  hence, it does not allow for overshooting  in fit.
External factors
Among the external variables  that could affect capital inflows the intemational  interest rate is a
primary candidate. Two forces are at work: increases  in the level of international  interest rates make the
opportunity  cost of investing in developing  countries higher, thus reducing  the desired stock of foreign
assets, and increases  in international  interest  rates raise the total debt service obligation  of the borrowing
countries  (for the portion  of their external debt contracted  at a variable  rate), thus increasing  their risk of
default  and reducing  their creditworthiness.  Therefore,  the expected  sign is negative.
14  The justification  for including two partial adjustment  terms  can be better understood by noticing that the decision to continue an
investment project is different from the decision to start a new one.  Moreover, FDI usually involves large investments that may take
several  years to  implement  and may imply long-term contractual (binding) obligations.  A more restrictive  version  of the model
would set y equal to zero. For simplicity, only one period lag is assumed.
I1Domestic factors
Because there are many potential  domestic  factors explaining  the determination  of the desired
stock of foreign liabilities,  the impact of these variables will be related through their effect on the
investment  climate.
*  Investment  rate: Higher investment  rates can improve  the productive  capacity  of a country, which in
turn can increase its repayment capacity as it achieves  higher economic growth.  Therefore, the
expected sign is positive.  However,  investment  can be financed  by foreign savings, meaning that a
positive  correlation  between  investment  rates and capital inflows  may occur if foreign savings is the
major source of investment financing. Two caveats are in order here.  First, empirical evidence
suggests that this problem may not be very important,  as the bulk of investment in developing
countries is financed by domestic savings.' 5 Second, the appropriate  use of lags minimize this
simultaneity  or exogeneity  problem.
*  Domestic savings rate: Complementarity  among different types of savings, foreign and domestic,
would reinforce  the commitment  to increases in the productive capacity  and creditworthiness  of a
country.16  Private  savings  is intrinsically  related  to private  consumption. Two alternative  approaches
should be  tested. One implies that higher consumption levels are  associated with  individual
perceptions  of higher permanent  income,  which results  in a higher desired stock of foreign liabilities
today.  Under this interpretation,  individuals  that want to smooth their consumption  levels across
time-if  not liquidity constrained-would borrow to increase  their current consumption  levels, and
this borrowing  will lead to a positive  relationship  between  consumption  and capital flows. The second
view implies  more conservative  foreign  investors,  who will be tempted  to invest in those countries  in
which private savings are complementary  to external savings. Under this interpretation,  in which
foreign investors see private savings as a signal of confidence in the prospects of the domestic
I  About 95 percent oftotal  investment  in developing  countries  during 1988-93  was financed  by domestic  savings.  IMF (1994).
16  Feldstein  and Horioka (1980) and Dooley, and others (1987) find strong positive correlations between  national savings and
domestic investment  rates.  This finding has  been  interpreted  as  evidence  of capital immobility. If capital were mobile, there would
be no reason  to predict that countries with relatively high  saving ratios over a given period would also have relatively high
investment  ratios,  since  savings  would be redistributed  to countries  that offered  relatively high rates  of return  on physical  capital.
12economy,  the expected  sign of private  consumption  is negative.  Decreases  in private  consumption  rule
out the possibility  of a consumption  boom and signal a favorable  domestic investment climate to
foreign  investors.
*  Instability:  There are a number of variables  that indicate  the uncertainty  of investing in a country.
These include the variability of the real exchange rate, the variability of inflation, and political
instability.  Of course,  instability  makes a country  unattractive  from the investor's  point  of view.
*  Exports:  Export growth  is an indicator  of both the capacity  of the domestic  economy  to compete with
the rest of the world, and of the development  of the tradable  sector within  the economy.  This measure
indicates  a country's  repayment  capacity  and is expected  to have a positive  coefficient.
Other  variables
Official and Private Debt:  As the level of debt increases,  given a fixed repayment  capacity, the
solvency  (creditworthiness)  of a particular  country  decreases,  making  it less attractive  to invest in.  In the
empirical  exercise  below  we attempt  to distinguish  between  official  and private  creditors.' 7
Results
As in previous  studies  panel data regression  analysis is used (table 5).  This is the most efficient
and consistent  estimation  technique  if there is a sample of several countries  in which each has only a few
data points.  In fact, the use of panel data allows for the most efficient examination of cross-country
relationships  at any point in time  and country-specific  changes  over time.
After some preliminary  tests (that is, Hausman's  test),  the model  was estimated  with fixed effects.
The estimated  regression  is of the following  type:'a
17  The stock of debt  held by private  creditors is more likely to be the variable  associated with the partial adjustment  parameter
(6  in  equation 4).  In all  the regressions,  however, this  parameter tums  out  to  be not  significantly  different  from the  one that
includes total extemal  debt. Thus the reported regressions include debt contracted with both official and private creditors.
la  This follows from equation 4.
13Fi, =ai+  51INVIr-I+  I2CONS,,-i+  53DRES,,-i+  04VRER,,+  5sDBRAD+  06EXPG,,-,+  7IUS*+  SF,i-i+  jd
where,
F:  total long-term private flows (as defined above), as a ratio of GNP.
INV:  two-year moving average of gross domestic investment, as a ratio of GNP.
CONS: two-year moving average of aggregate private consumption, as a ratio of GNP.
DRES:  total external debt  minus the stock of  international reserves, as a  ratio of  GNP.  Alternatively,
TSFL (total stock of foreign liabilities) is included in the regressions.  TSFL is calculated as the total debt
minus  reserves, plus the accumulated flows of portfolio equity and foreign direct investment since 1970
(assuming a zero rate of depreciation), also measured as a ratio of GNP.19
VRER: volatility of the real effective exchange rate, computed as the intra-annual (12 month) variance.
DBRAD:  dummy variable to identify those countries that have successfully completed a Brady operation.
EXPG:  real export growth (in percent).
IUS:  U.S. interest rates (in percent).  Three alternative rates are used:  ITBND3 is the U.S. three-year
government bond yield; ITB12 is the twelve-month U.S. treasury bond rate, and IPRIN is the first principal
component  of  five interest rates and the  U.S. industrial production  index (see the  papers by  Calvo and
others, and by Chuhan and others).
,L  : error term.
As argued earlier, the model is designed to capture long-term variations  in the desired stock of
foreign  investment (foreign  liabilities) resulting  from permanent changes  in fundamentals.  Hence, gross
investment and private consumption are averaged over a  two-year period in an attempt to capture  their
long-term (permanent) component-as  opposed to their transitory or cyclical components. Both variables
are  lagged one  period to minimize the risk of  simultaneity bias. Also as  argued above,  one  lag  of the
dependent variable  is included  in the  regression because investment projects-in  particularly  FDI-may
19 See  Femandez-Arias  and  Montiel (1995).
14take more than one year to be fully implemented. The expected  signs of the coefficients  are given in
parentheses  in the equation.
The regressions  reported in Table 5 suggest the robustness of the parameters.  The findings
support  the importance  of domestic  factors  in explaining  the recent  wave of private  capital inflows.
The second  column  of table 5 shows  that capital flows  respond  positively  to increases  in domestic
investment  (in previous periods)  and, most importantly,  that foreign savings tends to complement  rather
than substitute  for private  domestic  savings. Both the investment  and private  consumption  coefficients  are
significant.
Also as  expected, the  partial adjustment coefficient of  total  indebtedness net  of  foreign
reserves,  P,,  is negative  and significant. As mentioned  earlier,  results  are not significantly  different  when
the total stock  of foreign  liabilities  is used (see Columns  3 and 6 of table 5).
The measure  of instability  (volatility  of the real  exchange  rate) also has a negative  and statistically
significant  effect on net long-term  private  capital inflows.  Exchange  rate volatility  probably  affects capital
inflows  by jeopardizing  the development  of the export industry. The parameter  of the real exports growth
rate is surprisingly  low (with  the correct  sign),  although  not significant.
Most striking is the result that capital inflows  do not seem to be sensitive  to the 12-month  U.S.
Treasury bill rate. Even more, the parameter  associated  with the interest  rate has the opposite sign (than
expected). This  result contradicts  the findings  in all the papers  cited above.  At least three explanations  can
be offered  for this result: use of a different  sample period; interest  rate misspecification;  and a different
specification  of capital  flows.
15Sample period
The time period used in our study differs from those in previous papers in that the other authors'
samples include mostly years  in which interest rates were decreasing.  Indeed, for the  sample  1989-93
there  is a  clear, negative correlation between  interest rates and  capital flows  (see figure  1).  But, for a
longer sample period this conclusion is no longer valid. 20
To account for previous papers' findings, an additional explanatory variable, IDUM90, is added to
the regression  in column 2. This variable is a  multiplicative dummy for the  interest rate for  1990-93, a
period of greater financial integration and declining U.S. interest rates. Our objective here is to show that
the results by  Calvo and others (1993), and Fernandez-Arias (1994), are sensitive to the sample period that
they are using. This dummy variable may capture a structural change in the relationship between  capital
inflows and international interest resulting from the financial liberalization of the late 1980s, which led to a
more integrated financial world. Column 2 shows that this parameter is negative, making the total effect of
the interest rate during  1990-93 negative (the sum of 1,  and P. equals -0.00038).  The results, however,
capture  only partially  the  previous  literature findings since the parameter  for the  interest  rate  dummy,
IDUM90, is not statistically significant at the  10 percent level (the t-test for the sum of 1, and j,3 equals -
21 0.29).
Interest  rate misspeciffcation
Other estimations, reported  in columns 4 to 7, confirm that the results reported in column 2 are
robust to the use of other interest rate measures, such as the three-year U.S. Treasury bond rate (columns 4
to 6) and  the  first principal component  of several U.S. interest rates and  the U.S.  industrial production
20  Table A.).  (second  column) reports  that interest  rates  are negatively  correlated  with total flows during 1986-93,  but positively
correlated  during 1979-93.
21  Furthermore,  a variance decomposition  carried  out using the results  in column 2 shows  that pull factors, as a block, explain
about 32 percent  of the variation in inflows in the short-run (66 percent  taking a long-term approach),  while push factors  explain
only I percent  (2 percent  using a long-term  approach).
16index (column 7, used in Calvo and others, and in Chuhan and others). 22 This proves that our results differ
from those reported elsewhere not because of the particular interest rate measure we are using.23
Different specification of capital flows
Foreign direct investment, which  is not included in the  inflows measure used in the studies by
Fernandez-Arias, and Chuhan and others, and which represents the largest share of total private flows in
our sample (see table 9 below), may be less sensitive to changes in interest rates than, say, portfolio flows
(the dependent variable used by most of the other authors). 24  When the dependent variable is total long-
term capital flows excluding foreign direct investment, the total effect of the international interest rate on
private  capital  flows  during  1990-93, not  statistically different  from  zero  even  though  the  estimated
parameter  for the  interest  rate dummy  variable  (IDUM90)  becomes negative  and  significant  (table  6,
columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). Thus, for example, the sum of 1, and f,3  in regression 2, table 6, equals 0.00006,
25 while the t-test for this sum equals 0.05.
Even though  these results do not completely  corroborate the findings of Calvo and others,  and
Fernandez-Arias, they appear to be consistent with those of Niehans (1994) and Stockman (1988).  These
papers  argue  that there  is not  a  straightforward relation between  interest  rate  differentials  and  capital
flows.
2 6
Additional  regressions are  used to test  for the robustness  of our  findings.  A  third  regression
excludes all (private) publicly guaranteed bank lending from the dependent variable, because this type of
22  As it is shown  in Table A. I all the altemative measures for the level of U.S. interest rates  are highly correlated.  See also  the
discussion  in Chuhan and others (1993) and in Femandez-Arias (1994).
23  One possible reason for the low explanatory power of the intemational  interest rate in all our regressions is that we are using  a
small number of time-series observations (8 years).
24  FDI also seems to show higher persistence over time than other types of flows, which probably explains the larger coefficient
for the lagged dependent variable in tables 5 and 8 than in table 6.
25  A variance decomposition carried out using the results in column 2, table 6, shows that pull factors, as a block, explain about 56
?ercent  of the variation in inflows both in the short run and in the long run, while push factors explain only 6 percent.
6  Niehans  (1994)  points out  that "If the underlying shift  occurs in  the domestic demand  or supply of  domestic  assets, capital
seems to flow toward higher interest rates, but if the shift occurs in the domestic demand or supply of foreign assets, capital seems to
flow in the direction of lower yields."
17flow may consist of nonvoluntary lending, especially during 1986-89 (table 7). The results are not
significantly  different  from  the regressions  reported  in table 5. It is interesting  to note that the parameter  of
export growth becomes  higher and highly significant. Coefficients  associated  with interest  rates continue
to be small and insignificant,  although  they have the correct  sign. 27
Although  it is the purpose  of this paper  to explain  the most recent  episode  of capital inflows,  when
a longer sample  period-1979-93-is  used (table 8), the estimated  coefficient  for the lagged endogenous
variable is greater than the one reported  for the shorter  period (column 2, table 5).  28  Even though the
coefficients  are smaller in general, the results concerning  the investment  ratio, the international  interest
rate, and  the indebtedness  ratio (net of reserves) appear to be  consistent with previously reported
regressions.29  However,  coefficients  associated  with  the volatility  of the real exchange  rate and to domestic
(private)  consumption  turned out to be insignificant  over  the entire  sample  period.
This less  than fully satisfactory  result may be explained  by noting  that during  the years preceding
the debt crisis,  most of the borrowing  in developing  countries  was done by the public sector,  implying  that
lenders were probably less concerned about savings of the private sector. Also, several developing
countries  have only recently  began  to liberalize  their trade regimes,  meaning  that during  the late 1970s  and
early 1980s their exports were highly concentrated  in only one or two basic commodities  (such as oil or
copper), with low export elasticities  with respect to the real exchange  rate. The dummy variable for the
Brady deals turns out to be significant,  while the export growth parameter becomes  negative, though
insignificant.
27  Regression 7 in table 7 is the only one in which the coefficient for the interest rate dummy variable, IDUM90, becomes negative
and significant. Yet the sum of 07 and 1g is small (-0.002) and not statistically different from zero (t-test equals -0.78).  A variance-
decomposition  carried out using these results shows that pull factors, as a block, explain about 37 percent of the variation in inflows
in the short run (51 percent in the long run), while push factors explain only 2 percent (3 percent in the long run).
28  It  is worth  noticing  that  under  the  within estimator,  an  increase  in  the  number of  years  increases  the  consistency  of  the
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. In the small sample 19S6-93, this autocorrelation coefficient is biased downward.
29  Again, regression 7 in table 8 is the only one in which the coefficient  for the interest rate dummy variable, IDUM90,  becomes
negative  and significant. Yet the sum of 07 and P  is small (-0.003) and not statistically different from zero (t-test equals -1.08). A
variance decomposition  carried out using these results shows that pull factors, as a block, explain about 22 percent of the variation
in inflows in the short-run (46 percent in the long run), while push factors explain only 2 percent (4 percent in the long run).
18Long-term prospects
As argued above,  external factors are not expected  to worsen  drastically  in the short or medium
term.  Therefore,  developing  countries  may continue  to receive  flows if they implement  reforms  that lead
to an increase  in domestic  savings  and investment,  a reduction  in the size of the central  government  deficit,
and an increase  in the growth  rate  of exports.
The econometric  results discussed  above, when applied to a simulation  exercise,  show that an
increase  in foreign  reserves  of, say, 5 percent of GNP (a fall in net indebtedness  from 0.8 to 0.75), would
allow a "typical"  developing  country  to receive  a larger  flow of foreign  private  capital  of about 0.3 percent
of GNP in the medium  term (figure  3 ).30  Similarly,  a decrease  in private  consumption  and an increase  in
gross domestic  investment  of, say, 5 percent  of GNP  each, would  permit  a "typical" developing  country  to
receive  about 1.6  percent  of GNP  more in  terms of foreign  capital over  a period of four to five years (about
0.8 percent of GNP  each; figures  4 and 5).
One fmal exercise consists of analyzing  the effects of a debt-reduction  operation.  A Brady
operation  would  allow a "typical"  developing  country  to start receiving  a larger  (private)  capital inflow of
about 0.9 percent of GNP in the medium term (figure 6).  As in the previous simulations,  the inflow
increases  smoothly  and stabilizes  after  about five years. A Brady deal differs  from a simple increase  in net
reserves  because it  significantly increases the  creditworthiness of  the  country.  This  result  is
instantaneously  reflected  in increases  in  the secondary  market  price  of a country's debt. 3'
Could the Mexican crisis have been foreseen?
Based on the above analysis a final word concerning  the Mexican  crisis should be made. The
crisis triggered  in Mexico  last December  after  the devaluation  of the peso has at least  two components.  On
30  Our empirical  results  are downward  biased  because  of a small sample  problem  in panel data estimation  (see Arellano  and Bond
1988). Nevertheless,  this bias implies that the effect on private capital inflows of any of the other exogenous variables is
underestimated  in absolute  value.
31  For  a detailed  analysis  of the Brady  Operations  see Fernandez-Arias  (1993).
19the one hand, the crisis is related to the tragic events occurring in 1994, such as the assassinations of two
influential political leaders and the peasant uprising in the southern state of Chiapas, which most likely had
a negative impact on foreign investors' confidence. On the other hand, the crisis is also a consequence of
poor macroeconomic management and a lack of strong fundamentals.
Unfortunately, the effect of the former component is not measurable, at least not at this point in
time  given  economists'  current  understanding  and  handling  of  sociopolitical  events.  The  second
component, however,  is strongly  supported by our  previous analysis  and  by the  fact that  by end  1993
Mexico had poor fundamentals, at least compared with other countries within the HCIR group.  By the end
of 1993 all fundamentals were better for the average country within this group than for Mexico, except for
the fiscal deficit and total external debt (both as a percentage GNP; table 10). It could be argued, then, that
Mexico was more likely than other high-recipient countries to suffer a crisis if a negative shock occurred.
Furthermore,  our  results also seem to be consistent with the  different  impact that  the "tequila
effect" had across regions and among countries within those regions. It is well known that Latin American
countries were more affected by the Mexican crisis than East Asian countries, and that within the Latin
America region Argentina was the country that suffered the most. These differences can be well explained
by  noting  that:  first,  among  the  Latin  American  countries  Argentina,  like  Mexico,  also  had  poor
f-undamentals  at the end of 1993-in  fact these two countries had the worst fundamentals among all HCIRs
(see Table A.2)-and  second, in recent years the East Asian region has experienced an investment boom
(with the  exception of the  Philippines) while the Latin American region has experienced  a consumption
boom (with the exception of Chile; figure 7).32
32  For this comparison  across  regions  see also World  Bank  (1995: 16-17).
20Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the potential risks for developing countries of facing a major crisis-like  the
debt  crisis of  1982-83--during  the  1990s, especially after several  years of  receiving  large  amounts  of
foreign  capital  in the form  of  (mainly)  foreign direct investment and  portfolio  flows (both  equity  and
bonds).  We conclude that a major crisis caused  by external  factors, mainly an increase in international
interest rates, is very unlikely to occur in the short or medium term, suggesting that developing  countries
may act to reduce the possibility of  a generalized reversal of flows, even after the Mexican crisis.
Econometric results support the importance of pull factors as determinants of  the recent wave of
long-term private capital inflows to developing countries.  Therefore, developing countries may continue
to attract flows if they continue in the direction of recent years:  improve the domestic investment climate
by creating a less risky environment and improving their fundamentals.
Our empirical results suggest that countries may increase the  amount of  foreign private capital
they  receive (as a  share of  GNP) if they  invest more, reduce the  current  account deficit by  increasing
private domestic savings, reduce their  indebtedness, increase their  stock of foreign reserves,  boost their
export industry, and reduce the volatility of the real exchange rate.
These findings are important because they show that domestic factors-and  therefore  economic
policy-matter,  meaning that developing countries can avoid a reversal of flows.  The findings also imply
that countries that have not received large amounts of foreign capital may begin to do so if they implement
the structural  reforms that will allow them  to export, save,  and invest at higher  rates.  Reducing  their
foreign debt (which may call for a continuation of the debt reduction operations of recent years) may also
play an important role in attracting foreign private investors. This study also opens up a new direction for
further research in regions like Sub-Sahara Africa, which has not benefited from the recent surge in private
flows.
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22Figure  1: Private  flows and interest  rates  for all developing  countries
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Figure  2: Major  recipients  of private  capital  flows, 1989-93 (in US$ billions and  in present)
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iFigure  3: Response of long-term  private  capital inflows to an increase  in the
stock of international  reserves (percentage  of GNP)
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Figure  4: Response  of long-term  private capital  inflows to an increase  in
gross domestic investment  (percentage  of GNP)
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Figure  5: Response of long-term  private  capital  inflows to a decrease  in
private  consumption  (percentage  of GNP)
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iiFigure  6: Response  of long-term  private  capital  inflows  to a decrease  in
external  debt  through  a Brady  operation  (in percentage  of GNP)
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Figure  7
Change  in consumption  and investment  between  1985-1987  and 1992-1994
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HiITable  1: Aggregate  net resource  flows to all developing  countries,  1986-93
(US$ billions)
Year  Official  Official  Private  Foreign  Portfolio
Grants  Loans  Loans  Direct  Equity
Investment  Investment
1986  20.3  35.4  11.7  12.9  0.8
1987  19.3  31.7  10.0  16.9  0.8
1988  20.0  24.6  12.0  23.2  1.2
1989  19.2  23.4  12.7  25.7  3.5
1990  28.7  29.2  15.0  26.7  3.8
1991  32.6  29.2  18.5  36.8  7.6
1992  29.9  20.4  41.4  47.1  14.2
1993  30.1  23.8  45.7  66.6  46.9
Source The World Bank, Debt Reporting System. World Debt Tables 1993-94 and 1994-95.
Table  2: Aggregate net resource  private  long-term  flows to all developing  countries,
1988-94, by region and  type of flow
By Region  By Type
Region  US$ bn.  %  Type of flow  US$ bn.  %
Sub-Saharan Africa  9.1  1%
East Asia & Pacific  258.4  43%  Total Private  620.3
South Asia  30.6  5%  -of which
Europe & Central Asia  129.8  21%  -Private Loans and bonds  210.8  32.5%  (83.4%)
Mid. East & N. Africa  21.4  3%  -Foreign Direct Investment  302.0  48.7%  (16.5%)
Latin America&  Carib.  170.3  27%  -Portfolio Equity Investmnent  116.5  18.8% (0.1%)
Noe:  1994 data are estimated.  Percentages in brackets show the composition of private flows during 1977-1982.
Source:  The World Bank, Debt Reporting System.
ivTable 3: Total private capital flows by country (annual average, post-cutoff)
Total Private  Capital  Flows  Total  Private  Capital  Flows
Annual  average  post-cutoff  AnnusI  average  post-cutoff
Cutoffdate  in  as  a  %of  Cutoffdate  in  aLsa  %of
Country  Miinyss  1992 ON?  Country  MNllIons  1992 GNP
Low  Capital  Inflow  Recipienb  High Capital  Inflow  Recipients
ECUADOR  -13.6  -0.1  KOREA  1991  6571.9  2.2
ZAIRE  -7.1  -0.1  ARGENTINA  1991  5415.7  2.4
PARAGUAY  10.4  0.2  PHILIPPINES  1992  1413.3  2.6
NIGERIA  109.3  0.4  COLOMBIA  1993  1258.0  2.7
PAKISTAN  213.7  0.4  TUNISIA  1992  444.5  2.9
COTE  D'IVOIRE  38.7  0.4  VENEZUELA  1991  1761.4  3.0
SYRIA  84.6  0.5  INDONESIA  1990  3717.1  3.0
INDIA  1623.1  0.7  COSTA RICA  1991  195.0  3.1
PERU  1993  150.0  0.7  TURKEY  1991  3459.2  3.2
KENYA  60.7  0.7  MEXICO  1990  11793.5  3.7
URUGUAY  88.3  0.8  CHILE  1990  1637.6  4.2
EGYPT  293.0  0.8  THAILAND  1988  4546.4  4.2
ZIMBABWE  56.4  1.0  PORTUGAL  1989  4206.1  5.3
JORDAN  57.0  1.3  CHINA  1992  27619.6  6.4
MOROCCO  353.6  1.3  MALAYSIA  1989  4112.4  7.5
BOLIVIA  1991  67.8  1.3
BRAZIL  1991  5827.6  1.5
Source: The  World  Bank,  Debtor  Reporting  System.
Table 4: Macroeconomic  indicators for HCIR and LCIR countries
G(rft  Qi1m  Fk  P  1TO  Asd  T,U Ad  PsM  l  I..  Ib  M  iui  Ruip  rmuy
A6rY.  myh.  663%  11%  31.4'.  UP%  5291'.  462  22  59  14  12Z/.  23
mix  . 4  449%  S0o%  49%  717.  173%  77.1%  603  238  19.4  7.7  31  W/.  164
Nh  17.3X  16%  537W.  -24X  109Y.  3.1%  12/.  337  a1  05  01  15Y.  03
A-h  12A.  21W.  7S91'.  51%  nr.%  4S%  9051/.  314  48  73  3.7  65X  35
MN  231%  3Q?/  1363/6  123%  f6WY.  119Y.  161.4%  392  357  121  137  21N.  25.1
Mn  -60  1Q91Y/.  99  .091/.  571/.  3P/.  224  31.7  Q6  1.8  Q4  03-/.  02
Nogt:  Indicators  are  computed  for  the  different  countries  from  two  years  before  the  cutoff  period  and  up  to  1993  (or  for  1988-93
when  the  cutoff  is not  available).  The  only  exceptions  are  total  debt  over  GNP  and foreign  reserves  over  GDP,  which  were  averaged
from  two  years  before  the  inflows  started  and  up to  the  cutoff  period  (or for  1988-90  when  a clear  cutoff  does  not  exist).  The  latter
indicators  were  not averaged  over  the  entire  sample  period  because  they  are  not  independent  of  the  inflows.
Source: The  World  Bank,  Debtor  Reporting  System.
VTable 5: Panel data regression
Fat  =  a; +PIWNVjt-l+P  CONS  ,ti+I3DRES 1 i,l+±4VRERm,+PiDBRAD+±PEXPGit  -+p 7 IUSt+o3g  IDUM90t+8Fot l+ SIit
Dependent variable:  Private Flows
1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
INV,_,  0.083  0.097  0.103  0.080  0.094  0.101  0.066
(I 47)  (1.68)'  (1.80)"  (I.42) '  (1.65)  (1.75)  (1.12)
CONS,m,  -0.081  -0.087  -0.080  -0.082  -0.090  -0.082  -0.074
(1.59)'  (1.71)  (1.56)  (I.62)'  (1.76)  (1.60)  (1.45)
DRESt t  -0.035  -0.036  -0.035  -0.036  -0.033
(4.20)  (4.30) "'  (4011) ''  (4.23) ...  (3.90)
TSFL[, 1 -0.037  -0.036
(4.47) '"  (4.41)  "'
VRER,  -0.000035  -0.000036  -0.000040  -0.000035  -0.000036  -0.000040  -0.000032
(2.21)  (2.24)  (2.48) "'  (2.20)  (2.24)  (2.48) '"  (1.95)
DBRAD  0.00166  0.00355  0.00413  0.00103  0.00303  0.00355  0.00005
(0.25)  (0.52)  (0.61)  (0.15)  (0.44)  (0.53)  (0.01)
EXPG,,  0.000091  0.000107  0.000119  0.000098  0.000117  -0.000129  0.000038
(0.48)  (0.57)  (0.64)  (0.52)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.I9)
ITBND3,  0.000195  -0.000077  -0.000255
(0.15)  (0.06)  (0.21)
IT B 12  0.000481  0.000366  0.000197
(0.45)  (0.34)  (0.19)
IPRIN,  0.009410
(1.06)
IDUM90,  -0.000746  -0.000648  -0.000661  -0.000576  -0.008931
(1.24)  (1.09)  (1.27)  (1.12)  (1.03)
0.428  0.435  0.440  0.427  0.433  0.438  0.434
(5.92)  (6.00)  (6.09)  (5.90) "'  (5.98)  "'  (6.07)  "'  (5.97)
X2  30.0  33.7  37.3  29.7  82.2  39.0  40.6
p-value  0.0002  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Adj.  R
2 0.475  0.477  0.482  0.475  0.477  0.482  0.434
N obs  176  176  176  176  176  176  176
.Significant  at 10  percent  level.
**  Significant at 5 percent  level.
***  Significant at I percent  level.
Note:  T ratios  for the parameters  are  reported  in parentheses.  IThe  null hypothesis  in case  of X
2 test is the
Random  Effect Model. For the X2  test  the marginal  significance  level (p value)  is given in parenthesis.
viTable 6: Panel  data regression
Fit= ai +0 1UNVot-1+039  CONS 1t_  +DIDRESit-l+! 4 VRER;t+PsDBRAD+± 6EXPG 1 t _+j 7 lUSt+og lDUM90t+8Fit_+  l,it
Dependent Variable:  Private Flows minus Foreign Direct Investment
1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
INV,_ 1 0.096  0.115  0.120  0.093  0.115  0.120  0.098
(2.04)  (2.43)  (2.55)  (2.00)  (2.41)  (2.52)  (2.00)
CONS,-,  -0.058  -0.069  -0.065  -0.060  -0.071  -0.067  -0.061
(1.37)-  (1.62)'  (1.50)'  (1.40)'  (1.67)'  (1.55)"  (1.41)'
DRES 1 ,-  -0.030  -0.031  -0.029  -0.031  -0.030
(4.18)  (4.39)  (4.11)  (4.33)  (4.11)
TSFL,-,  -0.031  -0.030
(4.45)  (4.40)"'
VRER,  -0.000019  -0.000019  -0.000022  -0.000018  -0.000019  -0.000022  -0.000019
(1.39)-  (1.44)'  (1.66)"  (1.36)'  (1.44)'  (1.66)'  (1.40)'
DBRAD  0.00315  0.00569  0.00664  0.00267  0.00541  0.00591  0.00308
(0.57)  (1.01)  (I.11)  (0.48)  (0.95)  (1.04)  (0.54)
EXPG,-,  -0.000080  -0.000058  -0.000050  -0.000075  -0.000049  -0.000041  -0.000063
(0.51)  (0.37)  (0.32)  (0.48)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.38)
ITBND3,  0.001114  0.000733  0.000552
(1.08)  (0.71)  (0.54)
ITB 12,  0.001220  0.001060  0.000894
(1.34)  (1.17)  (1.00)
IPRIN,  0.000926
(0.13)
IDUM90,  -0.001002  -0.000914  -0.000904  -0.000826  0.002190
(2.02)  (1.85)  (2.10)  (1.93)  (0.30)
F,  1 0.356  0.356  0.356  0.357  0.355  0.355  0.353
(4.90)  (4.94)  (4.96)  (4.90)  (4.92)  (4.94)  (4.70)
x2  30.7  34.7  32.6  30.5  61.9  187.9  54.6
p-value  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Adj.  R
2 0.445  0.456  0.458  0.443  0.455  0.457  0.44
N obs  176  176  176  176  176  176  176
- Significant at 10 percent level.
**  Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at I percent level.
Note:  T ratios for the parameters are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis in case of X
2 test is the
Random Effect Model. For the X 2 test the marginal significance level (p value) is given in parenthesis.
ViiTable 7: Panel Data Regression
Fi 1 jt  +INVt_+,  C  +DRESit+P4VRERi  IDBRAD+EXPGt+p  IUSt+Og IDUM9Ot+8Fit_l+ Fit
Dependent variable:  Private Flows excluding commercial bank lending
1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93  1986-93
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
INV,-,  0.067  0.067  0.070  0.065  0.065  0.068  0.047
(1.35)  (1.33)  (1.40)  (1.32)  (1.29)  (1.35)  (0.93)
CONS,-  -0.090  -0.090  -0.085  -0.091  -0.091  -0.086  -0.082
(2.07)  (2.05)  (1.93)  (2.10)  (2.08)  (1.95)  (1.89)
DRES,-,  -0.017  -0.017  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015
(2.33)  (2.31)"'  (2.27)  (2.25)  (1.97)
TSFLt,-  -0.018  -0.017
(2.50)  (2.45)-..
VRER,  -0.000028  -0.000028  -0.000031  -0.000028  -0.000028  -0.000031  -0.000024
(2.10)"  (2.09)  (2.24)  (2.09)"  (2.09)  (2.24)  (1.73)
DBRAD  0.00352  0.00350  0.00370  0.00315  0.00311  0.00328  0.00172
(0.62)  (0.60)  (0.64)  (0.55)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.30)
EXPG,.,  0.000320  0.000319  0.000326  0.000324  0.000324  0.000331  0.000242
(2.00)  (1.99)  (2.04)  (2.03)  (2.02)  (2.07)  (1.46)
ITBND3,  -0.000727  -0.000721  -0.000779
(0.69)  (0.68)  (0.74)
ITBI2,  -0.000451  -0.000450  -0.000510
(0.49)  (0.48)  (0.56)
IPRIN,  0.010490
(1.41)
IDUM90,  0.000009  0.000050  0.000016  0.000052  -0.012560
(0.02)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.12)  (1.73)
F,1  ^0.334  0.334  0.337  0.332  0.331  0.334  0.328
(4.23)  (4.18)  (4.24)  (4.20)  (4.15)  (4.20)---  (4.18)
X2  28.2  28.2  29.7  28.2  44.7  76.3  29.9
p-value  0.0004  0.0009  0.0005  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005
Adj.  R
2 0.492  0.489  0.491  0.493  0.490  0.492  0.499
N obs  176  176  176  176  176  176  176
*  Significant at 10 percent level.
*  Significant at 5 percent level.
***  Significant at I percent level.
Not2:  T ratios for the parameters are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis in case of XI  test is the
Random Effect Model. For the x2 test the marginal significance level (p value) is given in parenthesis.
viiiTable 8: Panel data  regression
Fit = a; + 0INVit_ +P3)  CONS;t  l+PIDRES;t1  +43 4VRER;t+IIDBRAD+I 6EXPG;t 1+17  IUSO+3R  IDUM90t4-56Ft  + llt
Dependent  variable: Private  Flows
1979-93  1979-93  1979-93  1979-93  1979-93  1979-93  1979-93
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
INV,-  0.065  0.066  0.068  0.065  0.066  0.068  0.049
(1.88)  (1.91)  (1.97)  (1.89)  (1.93)  (1.98)  (1.39)
CONS,.,  -0.026  -0.029  -0.024  -0.025  -0.029  -0.024  -0.038
(0.89)  (0.99)  (0.83)  (0.87)  (0.97)  (0.80)  (1.30)
DRES,.,  -0.014  -0.013  -0.014  -0.013  -0.008
(2.78)---  (2.63)---  (2.81)  (2.65)  --  (1.52)
TSFL,-,  -0.013  -0.014
(2.95)  (2.98)---
VRER,  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
(0.09)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.27)
DBRAD  0.00980  0.01165  0.01194  0.00957  0.01160  0.01186  0.00903
(1.77)  (1.98)  (2.05)  (1.74)  (1.96)  (2.01)  (1.50)
EXPG,,  -0.000074  -0.000069  -0.000067  -0.000074  -0.000070  -0.000068  -0.000064
(0.71)  (0.66)  (0.64)  (0.72)  (0.67)  (0.07)  (0.62)
ITBND3,  -0.000014  -0.000088  -0.000104
(0.04)  (0.26)  (0.31)
ITB 12,  0.000049  -0.000026  -0.000052
(0.14)  (0.07)  (0.15)
IPRIN,  0.003846
(2.29)
IDUM90,  -0.000495  -0.000387  -0.000412  -0.000314  -0.006765
(0.95)  (0.73)  (0.94)  (0.71)  (1.91)
Ft. 1 0.519  0.516  0.512  0.520  0.516  0.513  0.499
(1.05)---  (10.45)---  (10.41)---  (10.57)---  (10.46)  (10.42)'--  (9.98)
X 2 27.0  27.1  36.4  27.0  27.0  28.0  29.4
p-value  0.0007  0.0014  0.0000  0.0007  0.0014  0.0009  0.0005
Adj. R2 0.566  0.566  0.569  0.566  0.566  0.568  0.572
N obs  330  330  330  330  330  330  330
*  Significant  at 10  percent  level.
**  Significant  at 5 percent  level.
**  Significant at I percent level.
No:  T ratios  for the parameters  are reported  in parentheses.  The  null hypothesis  in case of XI  test is the
Random  Effect  Model.  For the X 2test the  marginal  significance  level (p value)  is given  in parenthesis.
ixTable 9: Composition of private  flows for sample  countries
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Foreign Direct Lnnstment
-in US millions  7289.7  9403.5  8692.1  12056.1  17759.3  21250.4  224155  29732.4  38476.6  56595.0
-in % oftotal  private flows  28.9  42.8  55.0  75.4  60.0  79.6  54.1  52.5  45.3  52.7
Portoleio  Ftos
-in US  rnillions  2329.5  58121  3738.8  3524.8  8228.7  5628.4  6480.3  15918.7  31245.2  51583.8
-in % oftotal  private flows  9.2  26.4  23.7  22.0  27.8  21.1  15.6  28.1  36.8  48.0
Commercial Banks + Suppiers
-in US millions  155856  67722  33586  4156  36060  -187.5  12565.1  10929.4  15238.4  -699.8
-in%oftotalprisateflows  61.8  30.8  21.3  2.6  12.2  -0.7  30.3  19.3  17.9  -0.7
Source: World Bank. Debt Reporting System.
Table  10: Mexico and other  high capital inflow recipient  countries
High Capital  Inflow Recipients
Gross Nat.  Gross Dom.  Private  Fiscal  Total  Annual
Savings  Investment  Consumpt.  Deficit  Exports  Exports
(% GNP)  (%GNP)  (%GNP)  (%GNP)  (%GDP)  Growth (%)
Avg. (excl. Mexico)  26.7%  28.6%  65.9%  1.3%  32.2%  8.9%
Mexico  17.6%  22.8%  74.8%  -1.4%  20.3%  3.1%
Inflation  RER  Inflation  Foreign  Monthly  Total External
Variability  Variability  Variance  Reserves  Inflation  Debt
(0)(l)  (%)(2)  (%)(1)  (%GDP)  (%)(1)  (%GNP)
Avg. (excl. Mexico)  0.62  4.57  1.26  12.8%  1.30  53.0%
Mexico  1.08  7.99  3.48  3.5%  1.73  51.6%
Notes: (I) The group average excludes Argentina
(2) The  group  average  excludes  Argenitina  and Venezuela
Note:  Indicators are computed for the different countries  from two years before the cutoff period and up to  1993 (or for
1988-93 when the cutoff  is not  available). The only exceptions  are total debt over  GNP and foreign reserves  over GDP,
which were averaged from two years  before the inflows started and up to the cutoff period (or for  1988-90 when  a clear
cutoff  does  not  exist).  The  latter  indicators  were  not  averaged  over  the  entire  sample  period  because  they  are  not
independent of the inflows.
Source: World Bank, Debtor Reporting System.
xAppendix
Data
We use  annual  long-term  private capital  inflows data-the  sum of  FDI,  portfolio  flows,  and
private net flows on debt-for  22 developing  countries for 1986-1993.  As argued  earlier, our  study is
more comprehensive than previous research because it includes FDI (which is almost fifty percent of total
private inflows) as part of long-term private capital flows. All data on financial flows, stocks and reserves
are World Bank's from the Debtor Reporting System.  1 Data on national accounts were obtained from The
World Bank Database (ANDREX).
Data on international interest rates and the US industrial production index were obtained from the
IMF's  International Financial Statistics and from the Federal Reserve Board's  publications.  Interest rates
used are: three-months U.S. Treasury bill rate (IES line 60c), certificate of deposit rate (IES line 601c); 10-
year  U.S.  government  bond yield  (IFS line  61); three-month  LIBOR (IFS  line 601dd); and  three-year
government bond yield (IFS line 61a).  The U.S. production index was also taken from IFS (line 66).  The
12-months U.S. Treasury  bill  rate was  obtained  from  the  U.S. Federal  Reserve  Board.  Data  on  real
effective exchange rates were obtained from the IMF.
These data corresponds to those published in World Bank (1994).
xiTable A.1: Panel  data correlations
Pand  Data  Correlations:  19S6-1993
Total Prinvate  Total Private  Investment  Priv.Cons.  Debt-  Variance  US  10-yr  US  T-bill PC  US  Int
Flows  Flows  t-l  Mov.Avg.t-lMov.Avg.t-lReservest-l  REER  bond  yield  rate  Rat. &  Ind.
Prod.Index
Total  Flows  I
Total  Flows  (-1)  0.6239  1
Inv. Mov.Av.  (-I)  0.2843  0.2642  1
Priv.Cons.MA  (-1)  -0.0751  0.0337  -0.6269  1
Debt-Res(-1)  -0.0731  0.1209  -0.3297  0.7194  1
Var.REER  -0.1231  -0.1063  -0.1800  0.0434  -0.0753  1
US 10-yr  bond  yield  -0.1660  -0.1123  -0.08S8  0.0254  0.1504  0.0329  1
US  T-bill rate  -0.0998  -0.0703  -0.0717  0.0090  0.1300  0.0712  0.8879  1
PCUS  lnt Rates  and  IPI  -0.1313  -0.0925  -0.0845  0.0192  0.1442  0.0594  0.9527  0.9840  1
Panel  Data  Correlations:  1979-1993
Total Private  Total Private  Investment  Priv.Cons.  Debt-  Variance  US  10-yr  US  T-bill PC  US  Int
Flows  Flows  t-l  Mov.Avg.  t-l Mov.Avg.  t-l Reserves  t-l  REER  bond  yield  rate  Rat. &  Ind.
Prod.Index
Total  Flows  I
Total  Flows  (-l)  0.7229  1
Inv. Mov.Av.  (-1)  0.3345  0.3212  1
Priv.Cons.MA  (-1)  -0.1030  -0.0209  -0.5494  1
Debt-Res(-l)  -0.0913  0.0305  -0.2849  0.5761  1
Var.REER  -0.0783  -0.0796  -0.1601  0.0409  0.1464  1
US 10-yr  bond  yield  0.1775  0.2260  0.1230  -0.0365  -0.1722  0.0360  1
US  T-bill rate  0.2065  0.2159  0.1347  -0.0751  -0.2209  -0.0001  0.9051  1
PCUS  Int Rates  and  1PI  0.1989  0.2236  0.1321  -0.0604  -0.2054  0.0129  0.9641  0.9849  1
xiiTable A.2: Macroeconomic  indicators for HCIR and LCIR countries: individual country means
Gros Nat.  Gros Dom.  Private  Fiscal  Total  Annral  Total  Ext. Political  laflafdon  RER  laisdtle.  Foeip  Monthly
Savinp  Investment  Consampt. DetiCit  Exports  Exports  Debt  Risk  Index  Variabilit Varlabilit  Variance Reserv  laflatia
(°/  GNP)  (/.GNP)  (%GNP)  (%GNP)  (/.GDP)  Growth  ('GNP)  (%)  (%)  (/GDP)  (')
High  Capital  inflow  Recipientb
Malaysia  31.8%  32.2%  53.7%  0.1%  73.7%  13.1%  62.9%  52.6  0.8  3.4  0.1  24.4%  0.3
China  465%  44.9%  60.3%  2.3%  194%  14.6%  12.0%  50.8  0.1  2.3  0.1  8.8%  0.8
Portugal  26.1%  29.2%  64.7%  4.9/.  39.6%  6.5%  46.4%  60.3  0.3  7.4  0.2  31.8%  0.8
Thailand  32.1%  37.6%  60.2%/  -1.5%  34.3%  17.3%  41.6%  464  1.0  1.6  0.4  9.5'4  0.3
Chile  25.2%  28 1%  72.8%  -2.4%  35.4%  11.1%  72.6%  46.3  05  2.4  0.7  15.8%  1.3
Mexico  17.6%  22.8%  74.8%  -1.4%  20.3%  3.1%  51.6%  41.7  1 1  8.0  3.5  3.5%  1.7
Turkey  220%.  23.4%  66.5%  4.8%  25.6%  87%  48.8%  51.0  1.0  9.5  4.4  7.5%  4.4
Costa  Rica  201%  29.2%  63.6%  0.7%  402%  107%  77.1%  n/a  0.4  1.4  0.5  11.7Y  1.4
Indonesia  33.3%  35.6%  580/.  0.9/.  24.1%  61%  58.8%  47.2  0.7  14  0.7  7.3%  0.7
Venezuela  20.0%/  16.5%  67.5%  0.1%  25 4%  60%.  71.3%  41.6  1 5  19.4  7.7  23.1%  3.1
Tunisia  20.1%  25.3%  64 2%  3.8%  39.2%  4 2%  62  4%  n/a  0.5  0.5  0.2  6.7%  0.5
Colombia  225%  19.6%  70.1%  0.5%  193%  6.6%  38.5%  33.7  0.4  3.1  0.7  15.4%  1.9
Philippines  20.6%  22.6%  74.0%/.  2.  0%  32.0°/.  6.2%  70.0°%  34.5  0.4  15.8  0.4  7.2%  0.9
Argentina  17.3%  19.3%  90.5%  1.4%  109°/.  4.1%  64.6%  40.2  23.8  n\a  n\a  4.3%  16.4
korea  36.4%  37.6%  55.9°h  -0.2%  31.1%  95%  14.3%  55.0  0.4  6.0  0.2  6.4%  0.5
Gross Nat.  Gros  Dom. Private  Fiscal  Total  Annual  Total Ext.  Political  lenatina  RER  Inflation  Foreiga  Monthly
Savings  Investment  Consumpt.  Deficit  Exports  Exports  Debt  Risk index Verlabilit  Variabilit  Varulece  Reserves  laflatlon
(°.  GNP)  (/.GNP)  (%GNP)  (%GNP)  (/.GDP)  Growth  (%GNP)  (%)  (%)  (/.GDP)  (%)
Low Capitai  ltllow  Recipients
Brazil  21.7%  21.5%  62 2%  4 9°/  11.8%  4 3%  246%  41 0  7.4  nMe  n\a  1.9'4  26.0
Bolivia  3.3%  14.4%  81 2%  2.3%  189/.  -1.2%  93.4%  n\a  1.0  4.2  1 2  11  94  1.1
Morocco  21.8%  23.9%.  675%  3.9%  23.2%  07%  946%  n\a  3.0  1 8  1.0  36%  0.4
Jordan  -6.0%  30.3%  93.9%  4.9/.  86 8%  11.8%  146.6%  n\a  3.2  9 1  2.3  13.0Y  0.9
Zimbabwc  178%  23.4%  59.9°/.  96%  28.9%/  -I  4%  43.4%  n\a  1.4  nMa  2.2  4.9Y.  1.7
Egypt  10.4%  22.2%  84.2%  5.8%  197%  3 1%  161.4%  37.5  3.5  12.1  5.2  7.3%  1.3
Uruguay  14.4%  13.3%  73.1%  04%  26.6%  5.5%  51.5%  n\a  0.6  n\/  3.0  20.2/.  5.0
Kenia  14.4%  20.9%  60.9%  4.3%  25.5%  13.7%  67.8%  n\a  2.0  nba  5.2  3.6%  1.9
Peru  7.9°%  292%  134.5%  3.6%  57%  -0.4%  65.8%  31.7  0.9  nbn  5.9  10.5%  4.7
India  23  2%  25.5%  64.3%  6 8%  7.1%  11.4%  22 4%  32  2  1.0  9.4  0.7  3.8%  0.8
Syria  5.2%  16.8%  80.8%  -0.9/.  13  5%  -0.9°/.  154.3%  n\a  5.3  nMa  5.2  2.5%  1.2
CoteDlv&i  -34%  11.4%  74.0%/.  12.3%  38.3%  4.0%  136.1%  nla  7.5  n\a  0.4  0.3%  0.2
Pakistan  226%  19.4%  72.3%  7.3%  15.8%  13.9%/  44.8%  37.2  1.0  n\a  0.7  3.2%  0.8
Nigeria  14.9/  17.5%  77.1%  10.1%  29.4%  4.5%  1000%  34.5  4.3  40  13.7  4.7%  2.9
Paraguay  18.7%  240%  75.2%  -0.4%  34  8%  41%  57.1%  nMa  2.5  n\a  3.7  9.4%  1.7
Zaire  5.5%  10.9Y.  89.1%  6.  0%  25.7%  -3.8%  1008%  n\a  35.7  n\a  n\a  3.7%  25.1
Ecuador  17.5%  23.0%/  77.0%/  2 5%  30.9%  6.4%  111.3%  39.2  0.7  n\a  2.7  6.4%  3.7
Note:  Indicators are computed for the different countries from two years before the cutoff period and up to  1993 (or for  1988-93
when the cutoff  is not available). The only exceptions are total debt over GNP and foreign reserves over GDP, which were averaged
from two years before the inflows started and up to the cutoff period (or for  1988-90 when a clear cutoff does not exist). The latter
indicators were not averaged over the entire sample period because they are not independent of the inflows.
Source: The World Bank, Debt Reporting System, IMF and BERI.
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